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Shinichi NAKAHARA
NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratory,
1-1 HIKARINOOKAYOKOSUKA KANAGAWA, Japan
Abstract
We have developed a prototype electronic notary system
(CYNOS : CYber NOtary System). CYNOS proves facts by
providing the evidence (notary token) of events and/or actions
that could be used to solve disputes between entities. It is a sig-
nature-based system and uses various security techniques to
enable the timely certification of entities and fair and highly
reliable delivery. It also cooperates with our CA (CANP : Cer-
tification Authority for secure Network Platform) through the
network.
This paper describes CYNOS with regard to its service, functions,
and mechanism. The ability of CYNOS to support the non-
repudiation service and some issues on system management are
discussed.
The additional requirements that are needed if the certification
mechanism is to realize practical notarization functions are ad-
dressed.
1. Introduction
The popularity of EC(Electronic Commerce) and
EDI(Electronic Data Interchange) on the Internet raises sev-
eral fears such as eavesdropping, counterfeiting, spoofing,
and repudiation. The major countermeasures are cryptogra-
phy, digital signatures, CA(Certification Authority), and
NA(Notary Authority), respectively. In particular, safe and
reliable EC needs a certification and notarization mechanism
to prevent repudiation. Certification ensures the genuineness
of an entity before trading. Notarization safely stores the evi-
dence of events and actions during trading for a long term and
subsequently certifies the fact by presenting formatted evi-
dence (notary token). Namely, certification and notarization
are prior and post countermeasures that can ensure truly safe
e-Commerce. Some international standards have been estab-
lished [1][2][3] and several drafts are being studied.[4][5][6]
CA and NA are briefly addressed in these documents, and
they note that CA and NA are both a kind of Trusted Third
Party (TTP). The secure delivery mechanism has been stud-
ied as one of the main techniques of notarization [7][8].
In recent years, the simple certification or notarization
service has become popular, and many organizations now
provide this service in both public and private fields (ex.
ValiCert.com, Surety.com, e-Parcel.com, NetDox.com etc.).
Some provide the time-stamping service, some offer secure
delivery service. However, many of them do not distinguish
the creator from the sender nor store the data itself for a long
time, nor prove the action(creation, sending, receiving). Ob-
viously, we believe that no truly commercial notarization
service is available yet.
This paper addresses the usefulness of CYNOS as a true no-
tarization system and discusses some of the issues of CA and
NA systems based on our experience in developing CYNOS
and a CA system(CANP). A new approach to keeping the
consistency of a genuine entity is proposed.
The aspects of system operation and maintenance are not ad-
dressed here.
2. Secure and trusted services and mechanism of CYNOS
2.1 Overview of CYNOS
CYNOS is a typical TTP whose features are the provi-
sion of various notarization services, strict certification of
all participants, issuance of notary tokens, and high avail-
ability.
Fig.1 shows a typical CYNOS configuration. CYNOS
consists of notary server, web sever, fire wall, and client
agent. The real-time CA (CANP) and time server are ex-
ternal plug-in functions. The notary server includes evi-
dence data base and secure signing device (signer) which
is tamper proof and works in the same security domain.
The platform is UNIX based and includes OLTP (On-
Line Transaction Program)and Database system, both of
which enhance its availability.
The user, CANP, and time server may be connected
through the Internet. The HTTP protocol is suitable for
establishing synchronous communication among user,
CYNOS, and CANP.
2.2 Notary services of CYNOS
a) Existence notarization service
This service stores evidence proving the existence
of a piece of data and its possessor; the evidence con-
sists of a distinguishing name(DN), digital signatures,
authentication time, data, etc. (See Fig. 2). The remark-
able difference from the well-known time-stamping
service is that CYNOS needs the document itself and
the digital signatures of the creator and the requester as
shown in Fig.3. Notarization must process the data itself
and define and treat the creator (who is responsible for
the contents) and requester as different personalities.
Encrypted communication is adopted between client
and server using ESIGN for digital signature, FEAL for
encryption, and EC-DH for key exchange, all of which
are NTT created algorithms.
b) Delivery notarization service
This service stores the evidence of the delivery and
the reception by the intended recipient as well as the
existence of the data and the originator. The evidence
consists of the DN of relative entities, the digital signa-
ture information, authentication time, the data, receipt
from the recipient etc. This service uses either synchro-
nous or asynchronous operation depending on the phase
and entity. A sender submits the data with digital sig-
natures using the format specified in Fig.3 together with
certification information of the recipient (e.g. recipient
DN, CA.-DN, mail address). This phase is asynchro-
nous. The sender receives a claim check for the notari-
zation service synchronously, but delivery is not guar-
anteed. The authentication of every participant is done
by using CANP before the attention of data existence is
submitted to the recipient. The specified recipient sub-
mits a request for the data to CYNOS. Fig. 4 shows the
process of delivery transaction and protocol between the
CYNOS server and recipient using an encryption tech-
nique. Fig. 5 shows the details of decryption and creat-
ing a signature of the data in the receptionist's CYNOS-
Agent.
When the recipient takes the encrypted data from
the CYNOS server, the receipt is automatically generat-
ed and returned to the CYNOS server in some continu-
ous transactions involving the CYNOS-Agent that cor-
responds to the transmitted data (Fig.4). The receipt
consists of a digital signature of the received data(plain
text) by using the recipient's secret key. With regard to
this process, we considered the problems possible such
as terminal disconnect or timeout during delivery proc-
ess, which may raise the situation whereby the whole
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Fig. 4 Delivery notarization service
CYNOS-Agent
Data
plain data is left on the recipient's terminal without the
receipt being returned. When the data is valuable, this
situation means that unauthorized data leakage has oc-
curred and it is a kind of repudiation( The recipient
could insist on delivery failure despite getting the data.).
And it enable the recipient to get some valuable infor-
mation without paying any fee by canceling the trans-
action.
Against these fears CYNOS adopts a remarkable
protocol(See Fig.5) that includes encryption of the data
on the server, division of the encrypted data into some
pieces and serialized decryption and creating the piece
of digital signature and assembling of the recipient's
digital signature on the recipient terminal without leak-
age of information. The secret of this process is to de-
lete immediately the used piece of plain data for signa-
ture (property (8) in Fig.5).
In this mechanism the CYNOS-Agent plays a very
important role. At the entity's terminal, security opera-
tions (generating digital signature, encryption, key ex-
change, decryption, verification of the signature, access
to the CA) are done by the agent implicitly. In addition,
at the recipient's terminal, the user's digital signature for
the data(including sender's signature) is automatically
generated as above, and attached to the data which is
then sent to the CYNOS server in one action. This
phase is synchronous. Namely, the CYNOS-Agent
conceals the cryptographic operations and represents all
transactions as one controlled transaction. This ap-
proach reduces the success of any attack by the user and
realizes a well controlled protocol between user and
CYNOS.
c) Retrieve the certification of facts --- notary token
CYNOS issues a notary token as the certification
of facts (see Fig.6); it contains the evidence stored in
CYNOS after each notarization event and is accompa-
nied with a signature of CYNOS. Users can retrieve the
notary token by using the request format to confirm the
notarized data, events, actions, and related information.
We say that the original data is stored in CYNOS, so the
notary token is understood to be a copy of the original
data. The notary token is time sensitive as well as a
public key certificate. This means a notary token has a
finite life time and the signing key for the token of
CYNOS also shares those properties. To extend the
CYNOS life time CYNOS has multi-private keys and
the signing key for long term storage differs from that
for token; all keys are concealed safely (c.f. subclause
2.3 d)).
2.3 Accountability of the stored evidence
CYNOS adopts various mechanisms and functions
to increase the accountability of evidence and CYNOS
itself.
Some important items are as follows,
a) Strict authentication of entity at the notarization process
CYNOS currently recognizes five kinds of entities:
a register (sender), a responsible entity for the registered
data, a recipient, qualified person (not implemented),
and access permitted entity. CYNOS requires the digital
signature of the entity making the access without ex-
ception. In all services and in each entity's environmentFig. 5 Process in the recipient CYNOS-Agent
(1)Receive the encrypted whole data C(PT)
(2)divide the data into n parts--- Get C(PTn)
(5)Get the next encrypted partial data C(PTn+1)
until END tag appears inPTn
(6)decrypt the partial data --- Get PT n+1
(7)Create the partial Fingerprint (hash )
--- Get Hn+1 fromHn & PTn+1
(8)Delete the partial Data PTn
(9) n = n+1 Return to (4)
(3)decrypt the partial data --- Get PT n
[ Legend ]
PT : Plain Text ,
PT n : n th. partial Plain Text
C(PT) : encrypted PT
Hn : n th. hash value
(4)Create the partial Fingerprint (hash ) --- Get H n









Fig. 6 Certification of facts service
data
DN
(i.e. related terminals and the server) CYNOS verifies
entity genuineness of the attached digital signatures and
public key certification. In particular, the digital signa-
ture of the responsible entity is a mandatory item for the
data to be notarized. The responsible entity for data is
the originator and/or a collaborator or a approver for the
contents.
In the verification process, CYNOS dynamically uses
our real time CA (CANP) whose important features are
synchronous response and real time updating of the
public key status (generated, revoked , expired). Real
time CA is a severe requirement imposed by NA.
As demanded, CYNOS can cooperate with multi-CAs
that individually certify different entity attributes.
b) Authorization time
The time of CYNOS server's system clock, which is
periodically adjusted against a secure external time
source, is adopted as the authorization time. There are
several choices as to the authorization time (time of re-
quest reception or signature completion or data stored
or request completion etc.). CYNOS uses the time of
data storage after all participants finish their actions. For
example, the authentication time of the delivery notary
service is the time when CYNOS just stores the evi-
dences in its data base after the receipt including the
signature of recipient is verified on CYNOS server.
CYNOS does not care about the time specified by the
user. It is assumed that the user accepts the CYNOS
authentication time.
c) Stored evidence
CYNOS can store various evidence about who,
when, what, where, and how. "Who" is represented as a
digital signature and associated information. "When"
involves authorization time. "What" is the stored origi-
nal data. "How" addresses the requested service and the
recipient's receipt. "Where" is defined implicitly as the
network on which CYNOS exists.
d) Security technique
To realize adequate security, digital signatures, en-
cryption, and secure key delivery are set between the
user and CYNOS server under the CYNOS-agent's
control. The CYNOS server uses a tamper proof signa-
ture device, a FIPS 140-1 level 3 device, which protects
the private key hard and prevents it from being com-
promised. Also the device includes some signature keys,
that is, current private key and reserved key. At least two
signing keys are prepared for the functions of commu-
nication and storage, respectively. This enables a op-
erator to smoothly change the private key. As a coun-
termeasure to hardware faults, the private keys are
backed up in second storage with encryption by Triple-
DES. Also we prepare the Key Management System to
recover the secret Triple-DES key in case with key de-
struction.
2.4 Mechanism for enhancing the system and service reliability(availability,
trust)
Various countermeasures are used to increase the
system and service reliability of CYNOS as a TTP.
They include using the OLTP(On-Line Transaction
Program)and Database system, providing a synchro-
nous communication method, adopting the mirrored
disc and duplex system, setting a firewall, controlling
user access, and collecting various logs for audit. They
guarantee consistent and atomic transactions, ensure
high availability, and protect CYNOS against malicious
access. They contribute to the realization of highly reli-
able services of CYNOS. This is our solution to the
problem of long term storage.
3. Some remaining issues and someof our approaches
3.1 Continuous accuracy of a entity
As mentioned above CYNOS performs strict verifi-
cation of all entities of trade when notarizing data, but the
passage of time weakens the accuracy of their authenticity.
We have devised a verification mechanism to prevent this.
We set a fixed and permanent identification code (FID)
for every entity and store and maintain the relation be-
tween DN and FID in the CANP server. The consistency
is managed by the registration authority(RA) in the
CANP. For example when a DN of a certain entity ""A"
changes, "A" reports to RA which manages the history of
DN and relation of the current DN and FID and old DN.
CYNOS always refers the history of specified DN by
the requester to RA when it verifies the notarized data.
CYNOS veriifies the accuracy ofevery participant related
to the notarized data even if the public key certificates of
participants have expired.
We do this by setting CA and NA at the same site to
ease the operation and management load of our certifica-
tion mechanism.
3.2 Releasing evidence tokens that are outdated
CYNOS can customize the stored period as a sys-
tem policy (Usually from 1 year to 10 years). Outdated
data is saved onto secondary storage such as
ODK(Optical disk) or DAT.
The only solution to retrieving old data via on onli-
ne service is to extend the storage capacity. The large
scale notary service needs a break through to manage
this problem.
3.3 Volume estimate and managementof evidence
The storage volume of a notary system increases
monotonically because all evidence must be kept in the
NA for long periods. Our estimate of disk volume is
shown in Fig.7. It is assumed that each service requires
the storage of notarized data as well as the evidence ad-
dressed in clause 2.1; 5000 notarization services are proc-
essed in one year. The target data size ranges from 1KB to
10MB. The dotted and solid lines plot the estimates for
one year and three year storage, respectively. These plots
include the work area for OLTP and Database system as
well as notarized data.. This figure shows that, even under
such a moderate load, CYNOS needs from 3 to
300Gbytes and the storage volume increases nonlinearly.
Moreover, the total volume proportionally increases a-
gainst storing term. The required capacity is beyond our
expectation. Terabyte(TB) data control is considered to be
an exceptionally data warehouse service, but even a mod-
erately sized notarization service will need TB storage.
The storage device and its control, data back up onto sec-
ondary media(e.g. DAT, ODK, DVD ), and its safe stor-
age(media) of terabytes of data are important items de-
manding further study.
4. Discussion
4.1 Implication of CYNOS
CYNOS has the functions needed to store sufficient
evidence on events and actions. The services are suitable for
real electronic commerce because the data itself is stored
together with related information. Some time stamping
services can provide a data existence proof service where
the evidence server adds the authentication time to the fin-
gerprint of the data and issues a certificate with digital sig-
nature. [6][9] CYNOS is different in that it offers strict cer-
tification of all entities and high accountability of the evi-
dence as is described in clause 2.3. A notary service sup-
ports arbitration and adjudication, which demand the stora-
ge of the data itself together with other evidence. The ap-
proach of CYNOS, which is intended for TTP and high re-
liable real electronic notary systems, lightens the user's bur-
den and offers efficient proof.
4.2 Key compromising
To avoid the key compromising we use the special tam-
per proof device (c.f. subclause2.3). To separate the
communication signature key and storage signature key and
back up the encrypted all private key enhance the reliabiliy
of the CYNOS system. In addition we never disclosure the
public key of storage signature. And some spare private
keys help the key update. For example overlapping the 2
private key will enable to exchange its private keys
smoothly. On the notary service the revocation of notary to-
ken merely occurs except of compromising the NA's com-
munication private key. In that case CYNOS halts the re-
trieving and verifying notary token. But the original data is
safe in the CYNOS data base.
4.3 New services
The next advance will be an agreement notarization
service because most commerce involves the agreement of
the participants. This can be realized as an extension of the
delivery notarization service. Technically speaking, in addi-
tion to this paper, work-flow control and management,
document sharing and management, interactive co-
operation among competent qualified persons, users, attor-
neys, and NA will give essential and useful hints on notary
system requirements.
5. Summary
This paper introduced our prototype notary system
and showed that it can safely store evidence for electronic
commerce based on data exchange.
We showed that existing certification mechanisms in-
cluding CA fail to keep the consistency of entities. Our ap-
proach uses the lifetime identification of each entity by a re-
sponsible registration authority. Further study on the certifi-
cation mechanism is needed to realize the mature digital
signature based electronic society.
The monotonic increase in storage volume is an unsolved is-
sue. Commercial notary systems would require strict control
of TB(Terabyte) volumes.
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